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Economists and public policy experts contend that paper currency facilitates tax 
evasion. However, due to the illicit nature of tax evasion, limited empirical evidence exists 
to document or quantify this claim. I use the staggered implementation of the Electronic 
Benefit Transfer (EBT) program to identify a decrease in local cash circulation that holds 
constant the level of income to provide empirical evidence on the role of cash in tax evasion 
and offer magnitude estimates. The EBT program replaced cash-based government 
distributions with an electronic system. I use the staggered implementation of the EBT 
program across all states to estimate an increase in reported taxable income between $0.56 
and $1.15 for every dollar replaced with electronic payment. Next, I use the staggered 
implementation in the state of Missouri to estimate an increase in reported taxable sales 
between $3.83 and $8.48 per replaced dollar. Overall, my results suggest that cash 
transactions are an economically significant means by which small businesses evade both 
income and non-income taxes. The results are of interest to academics and regulators as 
they seek to better understand the impact of cash circulation on tax compliance and evaluate 
policies to improve tax compliance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Economists and public policy experts argue that paper currency (i.e., Federal 
Reserve Notes) facilitates tax evasion because cash transactions are difficult for 
regulators to trace (Slemrod 2007; Morse, Karlinsky, and Bankman 2009).1 However, 
providing reliable empirical support for this claim is challenging because it is difficult to 
measure both local cash circulation and concealed tax evasion. Therefore, while there is a 
general belief that small businesses use cash transactions to underreport income, limited 
empirical evidence and no precise estimates exist regarding the impact of cash on tax 
evasion. Consequently, tax enforcement agencies, policy makers, and academics are 
interested in better understanding the effect of cash on tax compliance. I contribute to this 
important public policy issue by using a novel setting to provide direct empirical 
evidence on the role cash plays in facilitating both non-income and income tax evasion 
and by producing estimates of the magnitude of the effect. 
It is important to understand how cash contributes to small business tax evasion 
for at least three key reasons. First, small businesses are economically significant and the 
single largest contributor to the U.S. tax gap (the level of overall tax noncompliance). 
Small businesses create 43.5 percent of the private non-farm gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Kobe and Schwinn 2018) and use cash transactions as a means to underreport 
income (Bankman 2007). The most recent estimates available from the Internal Revenue 
                                                 
1 Cash is sometimes used when referencing money as a transaction medium, whether digital or otherwise. I 
use the word “cash” throughout the manuscript to signify U.S. Federal Reserve Notes (i.e. “paper” 
currency). 
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Service (IRS) report a $441 billon gross tax gap for the years 2011-2013. The 
underreporting of business income by individuals is estimated at $110 billion or 29 
percent of the total net tax gap.2 This amount is larger than the tax gap of $37 billion 
attributed to all C-corporations, with large corporations accounting for $26 billion. 
Quantifying the factors that contribute to the underreporting of small business income is 
essential for regulators to design procedures that improve compliance and reduce the tax 
gap.3 
Second, studying small business tax compliance is important because small firms’ 
tax evasion tactics and opportunities differ from those employed by large firms. Small 
businesses have different disclosure obligations, financial statement audit requirements, 
and reporting incentives than those of large, publicly traded corporations. While all 
taxpayers have incentives to reduce taxable income, public corporations are limited by 
incentives to maintain their reputations and report higher income on their financial 
statements (e.g. Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2014; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin 2010; Mills and Newberry 2001). Small businesses, being mostly privately held, 
generally do not prepare audited financial statements that are publically available. Thus, 
small businesses enjoy a greater opportunity to hide cash revenues without negative 
reputation effects or stock market pressures. Despite these important differences, the 
majority of the accounting tax-avoidance literature focuses on public corporations, in 
                                                 
2 See https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf. Throughout this manuscript, “small business” refers to 
independent sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S-corporations having fewer than 500 employees, based 
on the definition used by the U.S. Small Business Administration for research purposes. 
3 See “That Stubborn Tax Gap” available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/stubborn-tax-gap 
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part, because of data availability. Yet, evidence on small business tax compliance is 
useful and important to those who study, design, and enforce tax law. 
Third, studying cash-based tax evasion is important because cash remains a 
prominent payment method despite the rise in alternative transaction methods. According 
to the 2018 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, cash is the second most common 
payment instrument for personal transactions. Cash comprises 26 percent of personal 
transactions, behind only debit transactions with 28 percent. The use of cash is largely 
confined to in-person payments, which account for 88 percent of all non-bill payments. 
For in-person payments, cash remains the most common payment method at 35 percent 
of all transactions. In-person payments provide a greater opportunity for tax evasion 
because they produce no paper trail, which make the transactions easier to hide from 
enforcement agencies (Roth, Scholz, and White 1989). 
Additionally, a single cash note can be underreported numerous times because 
taxpayers exchange cash multiple times annually. According to a survey by the Federal 
Reserve, cash is exchanged an average of between 50.4 and 55.2 times per year (Avery 
1986). Feige (1989a) uses the estimates of currency velocity and banknote replacement 
from the Federal Reserve to estimate the turnover rate of each denomination. He 
estimates small (large) denomination notes are exchanged approximately 115 (21) times 
per year. These estimates suggest the potential for a multiplier effect of cash circulation 
on tax evasion. 
To examine the impact of cash on tax evasion, I use the staggered implementation 
of the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) program from 1993-2004 to capture variation in 
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cash circulation. The EBT program replaced the need for government welfare payments 
to be made in cash. Instead, the EBT system distributes government funds to recipients’ 
accounts digitally, and the recipients can then use a debit card to pay for products using 
electronic terminals. The revenues small business taxpayers receive from an EBT card 
transaction are more difficult to underreport than from cash because of the associated 
electronic record. Using the staggered adoption of EBT program, I am able to identify 
changes to cash circulation that are plausibly exogenous to other economic factors that 
affect income.4 
I use Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) theory on taxpayer compliance to predict 
that a reduction in cash circulation will cause an increase in tax compliance.5 The theory 
states that a taxpayer’s compliance is affected by the perceived detection probability. 
Taxpayers use cash to engage in anonymous and virtually untraceable transactions, which 
decreases the detection probability of associated tax evasion. However, a decrease in cash 
distribution may not cause an increase in compliance if recipients withdraw their benefits 
in cash or businesses adjust the percentage of the cash transactions they report. 
Ultimately, whether, and to what degree, a decrease in cash circulation will improve tax 
compliance remain open empirical questions. 
                                                 
4 The change in cash circulation is plausibly exogenous to income levels because the objectives of the 
program were principally unrelated to tax evasion or economic activity. The central goals of the program 
were 1) to reduce the stigma associated with using food stamps 2) to ensure ease of benefit use 3) to reduce 
program fraud and 4) to reduce costs associated with mailing paper checks. 
5 There is a long history of tax evasion models that build upon Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) seminal 
paper. See Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod (2019) for reviews on taxpayer compliance. 
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I first examine the impact of cash circulation on reported annual taxable income 
using the staggered adoption of EBT across the United States. The national EBT 
implementation took place from 1993-2004 and has been implemented in all U.S. states 
and the District of Columbia. I find economically and statistically significant increases in 
reported taxable income after EBT implementation. Specifically, I find reported taxable 
income is higher by about 0.5 percent or $80 per person per year. I estimate that replacing 
one dollar of cash payment with a digital payment on an EBT card increases reported 
taxable income between $0.56 and $1.15. 6 The multiplier effect comes from the fact that 
a cash dollar can be passed “underground” a number of times before it reenters the formal 
economy. The multiplier explains why a decrease in cash circulation of $1 can lead to an 
increase in reported taxable income greater than $1. 
Next, I use the staggered adoption of EBT within the state of Missouri to examine 
whether a reduction in cash circulation also leads to a change in reported taxable sales. 
This setting is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it reduces concerns the results are 
impacted by factors other than EBT implementation because counties within a state are 
unaffected by policy differences across states. Second, it allows an estimate of the effect 
of cash on a non-income base, taxable sales, which Missouri reports quarterly.7 It is 
valuable to estimate the impact on taxable sales because taxpayers are more likely to 
underreport taxable income if they also are able to hide the taxable sale, which would 
                                                 
6 The range of estimates are derived using the amounts distributed under different programs included in the 
EBT system. I discuss these programs in detail in Section 2.  
7 I use the staggered, national implementation of EBT to estimate the impact on reported taxable income. I 
do not estimate income using a single state because income is reported annually and the Missouri 
implementation occurred within a twelve month period. 
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produce a verifiable paper trail through the sales receipt. Additionally, it demonstrates 
cash transactions affect both income and non-income (e.g. sales tax) tax evasion, an 
important distinction as not all jurisdictions administer each tax type. 
I find, after implementation of digital payment transfers, which average $166 
million per quarter, taxpayers in Missouri counties report taxable sales that are higher by 
7.9 percent or $116 per person per quarter. This equates to a total increase of $637 
million per quarter at the state level. I estimate that reported taxable sales increase 
between $3.83 and $8.48 for every dollar of payment replaced with digital payment. 
I compare the findings on reported taxable income and reported taxable sales to 
corroborate the validity of the magnitudes of the two results. If small businesses do not 
report revenue from a transaction, they correspondingly do not report the associated 
expenses because doing so increases the risk the tax evasion will be discovered (Morse et 
al. 2009). I reason that when taxpayers begin reporting sales due to EBT implementation, 
they also begin reporting the related expenses. This assumption is also consistent with the 
finding of Slemrod et al. (2017) that small businesses increase reported receipts and 
expenses in response to their electronic receipts being reported to the IRS. This indicates 
the average small business profit margin in my sample period is about 14 percent. I assert 
this estimate is reasonable and validates the estimated magnitude of effects on reported 
income and reported sales from the two settings.8 
                                                 
8 In 2017, the average profit margin for sole proprietorships in retail trade with net income was 13.91 
percent according to data from the IRS. https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-nonfarm-sole-
proprietorship-statistics 
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I perform several additional analyses to corroborate the main findings and provide 
supplementary evidence on the impact of cash circulation. First, I plot coefficients to 
provide evidence on pre-treatment trends. The results are consistent with reported taxable 
income not statistically increasing prior to EBT implementation. Second, I examine the 
effect of EBT implementation on more verifiable types of income and employment. I do 
not find evidence that EBT increased wages, dividends and interest, or employment, 
consistent with the effect being concentrated among small businesses. 
Next, I examine the effect of cash circulation on capital allocation for small 
businesses. Because small businesses rely on tax returns to support loan applications, an 
increase in tax compliance can also lead to an increase of capital allocated to small 
businesses. Using data on small business loans from the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA), I find loan amounts are statistically and economically larger after 
EBT implementation but there is no increase in the number of loans approved. 
Finally, I proxy for cash circulation using the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households. 
Underbanked households are more likely to rely on cash as a means of exchange relative 
to other transaction methods when compared to fully banked households (Apaam et al. 
2018). Underbanked households use alternative financial services such as check-cashing 
services that provide cash payments. 
I find that underbanked areas have lower levels of reported sole-proprietor 
income. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the 
underbanked population (5 percentage points) is associated with a decrease of $150 in 
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reported income per business. Given an average of 77,718 sole proprietor returns filed 
per MSA-year, this translates to a decrease of $11.7 million in reported taxable income 
per MSA, or an average decrease of about one percent of reported income per sole 
proprietorship. 
It is possible that regions with a higher underbanked population percentage have 
lower levels of true income that affect reported taxable income. To provide evidence this 
is not driving the results, I replace business income with three different types of income 
that are more verifiable and, therefore, unlikely to be impacted by cash circulation in a 
region: wages, interest, and dividends. As expected, I do not find a statistically significant 
association with any of these three income types. These results are consistent with the 
increased cash use in an area affecting only lower levels of reported small-business 
income. 
The results of my study are of interest to academics, tax enforcement agencies, 
and policy makers. Enforcement agencies have limited budgets and need to understand 
taxpayer compliance behavior to efficiently assess and collect taxes. My evidence 
supports public policy experts’ speculation that phasing out paper currency could “have a 
significant impact on discouraging tax evasion” (Rogoff 2017). Importantly, the results 
also demonstrate that improved tax compliance can be achieved without eliminating cash 
entirely. Instead, policy makers can incentivize the use of non-cash alternatives by 
providing digital welfare payments, increasing access to mobile banking, or providing 
accessible, low-cost bank accounts. My results suggest these measures would allow 
 9 




Chapter 2: Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
Tax avoidance and tax evasion are prominent research areas in accounting and 
public economics literature. The extensive accounting literature on tax avoidance finds 
largely that firms’ tax avoidance and reporting behavior responds to changes in disclosure 
requirements and public pressure (e.g. Hope, Ma, and Thomas 2013; De Simone 2016; 
and Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde 2016). The vast majority of this literature focuses on 
large, public companies (see Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; 
and Wilson and Wilde 2018 for reviews of the literature). In part, this focus is the result 
of laws that require corporations to publicly disclose the amount of income tax they pay 
and owe, which allows researchers to estimate tax avoidance activity. 
Despite the literature’s focus on large public corporations’ tax avoidance, it is 
valuable to study and understand small business tax compliance behavior, because small 
businesses represent an economically significant segment of the overall economy. Small 
businesses account for 43.5 percent of GDP and $1.03 trillion (27 percent) of U.S. 
individual non-wage income according to the most recent Statistics of Income (SOI) data 
available for the year 2017.9 Additionally, small businesses are likely to be more 
aggressive in tax avoidance because they do not have the same incentives as public 
                                                 
9 Data are available from https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-
publication-1304-complete-report#_IndReturns. The $1.03 trillion includes sole-proprietor ($346 billion) 
and partnership/S-corporation ($680 billion) entities. I include partnerships (S-corporations) because 73 
(92) percent have assets under $1 million, indicating the majority are small businesses. There are three 
sources of individual income larger than individual business income: salaries and wages ($7.6 trillion), 
capital gains ($854 billion), and pensions and annuities ($729 billion). 
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companies to increase reported income for financial statement purposes (Hanlon, Mills, 
and Slemrod 2007). Therefore, their tax evasion activities are thought to contribute 
substantially to the tax gap. 
The tax gap is the IRS estimate of the difference between the total taxes owed and 
taxes paid on time. The IRS began periodically estimating the tax gap in 1979 and 
continues to adapt the program to provide the most thorough and comprehensive 
estimates of tax noncompliance. The IRS develops its estimates by combining 
information from the National Research Program (NRP), formerly the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), with information from enforcement 
activities and focused research about a particular source of income, for instance, cash 
payments. 
According to the most recent IRS estimates, the gross tax gap for the years 2011-
2013 is $441 billion, which is almost 20 percent of the $2,242 billion of tax that is paid 
on time and voluntarily.10 The tax gap is comprised of three broad types of 
noncompliance: non-filing ($39 billion), underpayment ($50 billion), and underreporting 
($352 billion). Individual business income underreporting represents the single largest 
contributor to the tax gap, estimated at $110 billion or 29 percent of the total net tax gap. 
This is larger than the tax gap attributed to all C-corporations, with small and large 
corporations accounting for $11 billion and $26 billion, respectively. Therefore, 
                                                 
10 The IRS eventually collects an additional $52 billion from enforcement efforts and late payments for a 
net tax gap estimate of $406 billion. 
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quantifying the factors that contribute to the underreporting of income for small 
businesses is important for designing remedies that can help close the tax gap. 
In addition to helping improve tax revenue collection, improved compliance could 
lead to more efficient capital allocation. When small businesses seek capital funding, they 
generally rely on their tax returns to support loan applications. Consequently, income not 
reported on the tax return cannot support a bank loan and the taxpayer must rely on 
personal earnings and savings to fund needed operations. Properly allocating capital to 
small business is essential for the economy because the “self-employed, 14.6 million in 
all, represented 10% of the nation’s 146 million workers, and they in turn provided jobs 
for 29.4 million other workers.”11 A better understanding of small-business tax evasion 
could curtail income underreporting that impacts capital allocation. 
Policy makers and regulators argue that small businesses use cash transactions as 
a principal means to evade taxes. This view is consistent with the standard economic 
model of tax compliance formulated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). They detail that 
tax compliance is impacted by a transaction’s perceived detection probability, penalty for 
evasion, and tax rate. Because it is difficult for regulators to verify cash transactions, the 
detection probability of underreporting cash transactions decreases, which increases the 
utility and ability of taxpayers who use cash to evade taxes. 
Cash remains a viable payment option despite advancements in cashless payment 
alternatives such as debit or credit cards, electronic funds transfers, and other online 
                                                 




banking systems (PayPal, Venmo, etc.). According to the 2018 Diary of Consumer 
Payment Choice, cash is the second most common payment method that individuals use, 
at 26 percent of transactions, only behind debit transactions at 28 percent. Cash remains 
the most common method of payment for transaction amounts up to $50 and for all 
in-person payments. In-person cash payments provide a greater opportunity for tax 
evasion because they do not produce an auditable paper trail. Additionally, because a 
single cash note is used in multiple transactions through the course of a year, a note could 
be underreported in numerous transactions annually. According to a survey by the 
Federal Reserve, a cash note is exchanged an average of 4.2 to 4.6 times per month or 
50.4 to 55.2 times per year (Avery 1986). 
Estimating the impact of cash on tax evasion remains a difficult problem for 
researchers because of the nature of the activity. As Slemrod (2019) noted, “measuring 
tax evasion is highly challenging due to tax evaders’ incentive to conceal their behavior.” 
Tax evasion is illegal, so taxpayers necessarily conceal their actions to decrease the 
probability of detection. The concealment efforts of evaders limit the ability of interested 
parties to study and accurately evaluate tax evasion. 
Prior literature provides evidence on the factors that influence taxpayer 
compliance. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) adapt the economics of crime model from 
Becker (1968) to provide the foundational economic model of tax compliance. Jackson 
and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001) provide a summary of factors 
that affect tax compliance, including age, sex, education, income level, income source, 
occupation, peer influence, ethics, fairness, complexity, IRS contact, probability of 
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detection, sanctions, and tax rates.12 Among these factors, the most important determinant 
of tax compliance is income source. 
Income source significantly influences taxpayer compliance because certain 
sources, such as income from small businesses, are more difficult for enforcement 
agencies to verify than wage or interest income. This difficulty is primarily caused by the 
lack of third-party reporting (e.g. a W-2 for wage income or a 1099-INT for interest 
income). IRS tax gap estimates are commonly cited as support for the importance of 
income source. Slemrod (2007) notes the “most striking and important aspect of (the tax 
gap) is the huge variation of misreporting…by type of income.” The underreporting of 
verifiable types of income is relatively low: wages and salaries (one percent), pension 
annuities (three percent), and dividends (five percent). In comparison, estimated 
underreporting from non-farm small businesses is 56 percent, which represents almost a 
third of all individual income tax underreporting. Cash transactions contribute to the large 
underreporting of small businesses, but it is difficult to estimate precisely. 
Several studies indirectly measure the total impact of cash on the entire 
underground economy. 13 Tanzi (1983) examines the ratio of currency to the total money 
supply (M2) in a regression framework.14 He then calculates changes in the underground 
                                                 
12 Additional factors that impact tax compliance include how taxpayers value public goods and political 
alignment. See Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) and Cullen, Turner, and Washington (2018). 
13 Rogoff (2015) states “(t)he underground economy includes agents evading taxes, laws, and regulations. 
The size of the underground economy is not known within any precision…” and that “(e)ven with all of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s effort to estimate the tax gap, there is of course a high degree of uncertainty 
about the exact size of the gap.” 
14 The M2 is a money stock measure reported by the Federal Reserve. The M1 includes currency, traveler’s 
checks, and demand deposits. The M2 includes the M1 in addition to savings deposits, small-denomination 
time deposits (less than $100,000) and balances in retail money market mutual funds. 
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economy using the ratio of currency to the M2 explained by changes in the tax level. He 
estimates the underground economy averages $30 billion per year or 4.24 percent of GNP 
from 1930 to 1980. This model has been adapted to estimate the underground economy in 
foreign countries as well (e.g. Hepburn 1992). Feige (1989b) details alternative estimates 
obtained using similar currency demand models that range between $217 and $422 
billion for the year 1981. The estimates indicate about 20 percent of adjusted gross 
income (AGI) is unreported, which is consistent with the current IRS tax gap estimate. 
Although, prior studies do provide a rough estimate of the overall underground economy, 
their assumptions limit the implications for understanding how cash impacts tax evasion. 
Therefore, while these estimates may be informative, they are difficult to verify and 
“cannot provide much of a guidance for policy” (Tanzi 1999). 
Perhaps the most direct evidence on how cash payments affect tax evasion is from 
qualitative analysis. Morse et al. (2009) conduct field study interviews with 273 
individuals including, 92 cash business owners, 149 tax preparers, and 32 bankers to 
better understand who evades taxes, what taxes they evade, and how they evade. They 
find small businesses are less likely to report cash transactions because of a perceived 
low likelihood of detection and penalty. The revealed amount of underreporting could be 
remarkably high. When asked if small cash businesses report as little as 50 percent of 
their income, one interviewee responded “50%? No. I’d say 33%.” Other interviewees 
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noted they underreport income to save on income and non-income-based taxes, such as 
sales tax.15 
The authors find taxpayers rely on “parallel cash economies” to hide income. A 
parallel cash economy is a system where businesses do not report cash revenue, but they 
also do not report the associated expenses. They use the cash received to subsequently 
purchase supplies and inventory from their dealers off the books. Several accountants 
told the study’s authors “If you are going to cheat, cheat on the income side or cheat on 
the deduction side, but not both.” Their interviews confirm assumptions that small 
businesses do not report all of their gross income from cash transactions, and that cash is 
passed “underground” from business to business.16 However, they cannot quantify the 
degree to which cash contributes to tax evasion. 
I seek to add to our understanding of small business’ tax compliance by 
examining the effect of cash on reported taxes. I examine the impact on total reported 
taxable sales because it affects both non-income and income-based taxes, and I examine 
taxable income because it affects income tax directly. 
                                                 
15 Discussions with the Texas Associate Deputy Comptroller for Tax confirm that cash transactions can be 
difficult to trace. For example, many small businesses use multiple cash registers and direct all cash 
transactions through one register. Then they do not record or disclose any of those transactions for tax 
purposes. This type of evasion is generally only caught through in-person audits. 
16 The interview findings are also consistent with the empirical findings of Slemrod, Collins, Hoopes, 
Reck, and Sebastiani (2017). The authors find that after sole proprietorships are subject to a new 
information reporting requirement to the IRS, the businesses’ increase in reported revenues are largely 
offset by an increase in reported expenses. 
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2.2 SETTING AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
I use the staggered adoption of EBT programs to capture a change in cash 
circulation in a particular region that is plausibly exogenous to consumer spending and 
income levels. The first test uses cross-year and cross-state variation of transfer payments 
across all states in the U.S. The second test uses cross-quarter and cross-county variation 
of transfer payments within Missouri. 
EBT is an “electronic system that allows a recipient to authorize transfer of their 
government benefits from a Federal account to a retailer account to pay for products 
received.”17 EBT was established as an alternative government payment issuance 
platform as part of the Mickey Leland Memorial Domestic Hunger Relief Act of 
November 28, 1990 (P.L. 101-624). Pilot programs achieved the goal of improving 
benefit transfer efficiency. Consequently, the Conference Report for the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66) recommended the Secretary of Agriculture 
encourage state agencies to adopt EBT systems. EBT implementation at the state level 
began with Maryland in 1993 and concluded with California in 2004. It is now used in all 
50 states, the District of Columbia, and several U.S. territories. 
Several welfare programs are available through EBT. By far, the most common 
and economically significant are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 
(formerly referred to as food stamps) and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF). SNAP is available through EBT in all 51 jurisdictions and TANF is available 
through EBT in 38 jurisdictions. Smaller state programs, such as Washington’s “Aged, 
                                                 
17 U.S. Department of Agriculture https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/ebt 
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Blind, or Disabled” program, also sometimes are available through EBT.18 Appendix A 
lists the programs available through each state’s EBT program.19 
Among the federal and state EBT programs, the transition of TANF to electronic 
transfer resulted in the most direct decrease in cash that jurisdictions experienced. Prior to 
EBT, TANF benefits were paid by paper checks. Recipients would cash their government 
checks and use cash as a primary means of transaction.20 SNAP benefits were previously 
distributed as food stamps, a paper coupon-based transaction medium. While recipients 
had no legal means to convert their stamps to cash, they could illegally convert them to 
cash to purchase goods or services not permitted under the food stamp program (e.g. 
Pulliam 1997; Macaluso 2000; Schanzenbach 2007). EBT was implemented to help 
curtail this illegal conversion. Although no legal conversion mechanism existed and 
illegal conversion was relatively rare, it is likely the transition of SNAP to EBT 
contributed somewhat to decreased cash levels. 
                                                 
18 “The Aged, Blind, or Disabled (ABD) program provides cash assistance to eligible low-income adults 
who are age 65 or older, blind, or determined likely to meet Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability 
criteria based on a physical or mental impairment that is expected to last at least 12 consecutive months.” 
https://www.dshs.wa.gov/esa/program-summary/aged-blind-or-disabled-abd-cash 
19 The programs available through EBT continue to change and expand. For example, Public Law 111-296 
requires all states to implement the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children 
(WIC) through EBT no later than October 1, 2020. For WIC EBT activity see 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/wic-ebt-activities. 
20 California’s Post Implementation Evaluation Report on EBT supports the position that EBT caused a 
decrease to cash circulation. The report states that post-implementation “recipients no longer have to cash 
their entire warrant at one time and carry cash on their person or protect their food stamp coupons as if they 
were cash.” It is important to note that recipients can withdraw cash from their TANF funds using a point-
of-sale terminal during a purchase or by using an ATM. However, a transaction fee may be charged that 
varies by state and withdrawal method. Additionally, because it is business that are able to avoid taxes 
using cash, not the welfare recipients, individuals are not incentivized to withdraw and transact in cash. The 
frictions imposed by the transaction fee, the effort to withdraw cash, and the decreased security of cash, 
mean taxpayers are less likely to withdraw cash. This statement is consistent with my conversations with 
benefits administrators. 
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I use the adoption of EBT to identify a decrease in the level of cash circulation in 
a specific jurisdiction. I first use the staggered adoption of EBT across all U.S. states and 
the District of Columbia to examine the impact from a decrease in cash on reported 
taxable income. The national adoption occurred from 1993 to 2004. Appendix B lists the 
implementation dates of state EBT programs. The states’ adoption pattern is not 
associated with geographical clustering or state economic connections. The change in 
cash circulation is plausibly exogenous to income levels and spending behavior because 
the goal of the EBT program was primarily to improve benefit transfer efficiency.21 
Although Morse et al. (2009) document through interviews that cash transactions 
are less commonly reported, it is not clear that an EBT system will impact tax 
compliance. If EBT recipients choose to incur withdrawal fees (ATM or otherwise), they 
can continue to spend their benefits in cash. Thus, businesses would continue to receive 
cash payments and underreport report the cash income. It is also possible that businesses 
were reporting a portion of their cash transactions, and they could simply decrease the 
portion they report in response to an increase in more verifiable payment methods. 
Although these factors could explain that EBT adoption had no effect on reported 
income, they should not predict a negative association. Thus, I state my first hypothesis 
in the alternative form. 
                                                 
21 It is possible that receiving an EBT card in lieu of cash alters a recipient’s spending preferences. 
However, in their study on the effect of SNAP on the marginal propensity to consume food, Hastings and 
Shapiro (2018) note that “nationally representative survey data, and data from the Nielsen Homescan 
Consumer Panel, show that SNAP participation is only weakly related to a household’s choice of retailer.” 
Anecdotal evidence with state benefit administrators also indicates that EBT implementation did not 
significantly affect spending behavior. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1a: Reported taxable income increases after EBT implementation 
Next, I use Missouri’s staggered EBT adoption to examine the impact from a 
decrease in cash on reported taxable sales. Missouri staggered the implementation of 
EBT adoption by county in eight core phases from June 1997 to May 1998. Examining 
reported taxable sales provides evidence that cash directly affects sales tax, which is a 
non-income-based tax, and contributes to income tax. Wright et al. (2017) use this setting 
to provide evidence that less cash leads to less street crime such as robbery and assault. 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, I state my second hypothesis in the alternate form. 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: Reported taxable sales increase after EBT implementation. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Sample Selection 
The test data come from various government agencies: IRS, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), FDIC, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ Office of Family 
Assistance, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Small Business Administration, and the 
Missouri Department of Revenue. My various analyses use data that span from 1990 to 
2017, aggregated at either the county or MSA level. 
The staggered national EBT adoption occurred over a period of 12 years; 
Maryland was the first state to adopt in 1993, and California was the last state to adopt in 
2004. Figure 1 depicts the number of state adoptions of EBT programs by year. The 
largest number of states that adopted an EBT program in a single year was 14 in 1998. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s EBT Status Report provide implementation dates. 
Components of taxable income measures from the IRS SOI for the years 1990 to 2007 
offer sufficient data pre and post implementation, covering 18 years. See Table 1, Panel 
A for sample construction. The data include each available county for a total of 56,400 
county-year observations. I then drop county-years missing information from the IRS and 
BEA to conduct my analyses. This leaves a total of 55,338 county-years, indicating my 
sample includes about 97.8 percent of U.S. counties.22  
Missouri’s staggered EBT adoption occurred from June 1997 to May 1998. Figure 
2 depicts the counties of Missouri and their dates of EBT adoption. I collect taxable sales 
data, reported quarterly by the Missouri Department of Revenue, from January 1995 to 
                                                 
22 This estimate is based off the U.S. Geological Survey report that there are a total of 3,142 counties in the 
United States. 
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December 2000. The data provide sufficient pre and post implementation periods for 
analysis. See Table 1, Panel B for sample construction. Data for all 115 counties provides 
a total of 2,760 county-quarter observations. Dropping the 24 county-quarters missing 
economic profile data from the BEA, provides a total sample of 2,736 county-quarters. 
The final sample covers 114 counties per quarter for a coverage of more than 99 percent 
of the counties in Missouri.  
To provide magnitude estimates on the effect of cash on tax evasion, I collect the 
amount of money distributed through the SNAP and TANF programs from the U.S 
Department of Agriculture and the Office of Family Assistance. Appendix C lists the 
total average expenditures by state. Average annual (from 1997-1999) expenditures from 
SNAP and TANF are $17.4 billion and $21.4 billion, for a total of $38.7 billion 
distributed. As expected, states with the largest expenditures include California and New 
York, and states with the smallest include Idaho and Wyoming. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Design and Results 
4.1 STAGGERED EBT IMPLEMENTATION NATIONALLY 
I test hypothesis one, which predicts the impact of the staggered, national EBT 
implementation increases reported taxable income, using the following OLS pooled, 
cross-sectional regression: 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑐𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑐𝑦 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐𝑦 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝑐𝑦 (1) 
The outcome variable is the natural log of gross income reported in county c during year 
y. Unfortunately, the IRS does not report separately all components of gross income 
during the sample period for national EBT implementation. See Figure 3 for a timeline of 
sample periods and data availability. Ideally, I would prefer to test separately for the 
hypothesized effect on Schedule C Self-Employment income, with a falsification test of 
no-effect on wages, interest, and dividend income; however, that is not possible during 
the EBT sample period. My variable of interest (EBT) is an indicator equal to one for 
each full county-year after the EBT program was implemented. A significant coefficient 
on EBT indicates reported taxable income was impacted by the decrease to cash caused 
by the EBT program implementation. The magnitude of the coefficient measures the 
economic effect of the change in cash. 
I include a series of control variables (CONTROLS) to control for different types 
of income that impact purchasing power and spending behavior. WAGE is the amount of 
wages and salaries (in thousands) divided by the population. RETIREMENT is the 
amount of retirement income (in thousands) transferred from businesses or governments, 
including retirement and disability insurance benefits, divided by the population. 
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DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST controls for personal income from dividends, interest, and 
rental properties (in thousands) divided by the population. SUPPLEMENTAL is income 
from employer contributions to government social insurance and pension plans (in 
thousands) divided by the population. TRANSFER RECEIPTS represent income for 
which no current services are performed, such as unemployment insurance benefits and 
gifts (in thousands), divided by population. 
Overall, I expect all these income numbers (per person) to be positively 
associated with taxable income. However, retirees and high-wealth individuals spend a 
much lower proportion of income on taxable purchases, so I expect RETIREMENT and 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST to contribute less to taxable income. 
I also include EMPLOYMENT to control for the employment rate, defined as the 
total number of jobs divided by the population. EMPLOYMENT rate should be positively 
associated with taxable sales per person because people spend more when the local 
economy is doing well. Finally, I include POPULATION to control for the total 
population (in thousands) of all civilian and military persons in a county. I expect 
POPULATION to be positively associated because prosperous economies attract 
businesses and people. I also include county and year fixed effects. 
The national implementation occurred between 1993 and 2004, spanning the 
1997-1998 period of the Missouri implementation. I inflation adjust all per-capita dollar 
amounts to the midpoint year 1998, using the Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This allows a comparison of real dollars across my 
sample period. 
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Table 2, Panel A details the summary statistics. The mean (median) of GROSS 
INCOME is 12.73 (12.57), which represents $13,046 ($12,278) per person per year, 
where person is the entire population, including non-working children and retirees. Wage 
income is the largest income source with an average (median) annual of $9,162 ($8,039) 
per person. The employment rate is near 51 percent. The mean county population is 
88,500 with a median of 24,289, indicating population levels vary significantly. 
However, income data are not markedly skewed between counties. 
Table 3, Panel A displays Pearson and Spearman correlations. As expected, 
GROSS INCOME is generally positively correlated with the different types of income, 
including WAGE and DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST. Two of the income variables are 
negatively associated, providing preliminary evidence that different types of income have 
a differential impact on spending behavior and taxable income. 
Table 4 details the results of the first hypothesis. Column 1 includes the full set of 
control variables as well as county and year fixed effects. The coefficient on EBT of 
0.005 is positive and significant (p-value < 0.1). This estimate indicates that reported 
taxable income did increase, on average, after the national EBT implementation by about 
half of one percent. Compared to the pre-period average of $16,044 per person per year, 
the increase equates to an increase of approximately $80.22 per person per year. 
To provide magnitude estimates on the effect of a decrease to cash on taxable 
income, I use the amount of money distributed through the EBT program. Nationally, 
average SNAP expenditures are $17.35 billion and TANF expenditures are $21.39 
billion, annually. However, not all states make TANF payments available through their 
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EBT programs. Therefore, estimates on the decrease to cash range from $19.1 billion, 
which includes only states where TANF payments are available through EBT, to $38.7 
billion, which includes all states’ SNAP and TANF payments. As I discussed in Section 
2, shifting TANF payments to EBT caused a direct decrease in cash circulation, therefore, 
I assume transitioning TANF payments to EBT caused a dollar-for-dollar decrease to 
cash.23 However, it is less clear how much SNAP’s transition to EBT decreased cash 
because there is no legal mechanism for conversion from SNAP to cash pre-EBT. 
Therefore, I develop a range of estimates based on different assumptions about the effect 
on cash of SNAP’s transition to EBT. I assume the SNAP changes could range from no 
effect to a dollar-for-dollar decrease. 
Using these amounts, I calculate that, on average, by changing one dollar of cash 
payment to one dollar of digital payment, reported taxable income increases between 
$0.56 and $1.15. This range indicates that because a cash note is spent up to 50 times 
throughout the year, it can be underreported in multiple instances. Therefore, replacing 
cash with digital currency can increase the taxable income range by more than one dollar 
per replaced dollar. 
Column 2 tests whether the effect on reported taxable income is less pronounced 
in areas less likely to be affected by the EBT implementation. I interact EBT with WAGE 
to examine the effect of the EBT transition in wealthier counties. Again, I find the 
coefficient on EBT* WAGE is negative with a value of -0.005 (p-value < 0.01), 
                                                 
23 I make this assumption to provide a conservative estimate. If the decrease to cash circulation is less than 
the full amount of TANF benefits distributed, the estimated impact of cash on tax compliance would be 
greater. 
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indicating the effect is less pronounced in high-wage areas that are less likely to receive 
government welfare payments. In total, the evidence supports the hypothesis that a 
decrease in cash circulation caused an increase in reported taxable income. 
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4.2 STAGGERED EBT IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN MISSOURI 
I test hypothesis two, examining the impact of the Missouri’s staggered EBT 
implementation on reported taxable sales, using the following OLS pooled, cross-
sectional regression: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑐𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑐𝑞 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑐𝑞 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝑐𝑞 (2) 
The outcome variable is the natural log of taxable sales reported in county c during 
quarter q. My variable of interest (EBT) is an indicator equal to one for county-quarters 
ending after the implementation of the EBT program. H1b predicts EBT will be positively 
associated with TAXABLE SALES. A significant coefficient on EBT indicates reported 
taxable sales increased because of the decrease in cash caused by EBT implementation. 
The magnitude of the coefficient estimates the economic impact of the change in cash. 
Missouri’s EBT program implementation occurred within a 12-month time 
period, which should lessen concerns that results are affected by correlated-omitted 
variables such as changing economic circumstances that may have occurred over a longer 
period of time. To further control for the economic traits of a county that could impact 
reported taxable sales, I include the full set of control variables (CONTROLS) and county 
and year fixed effects from Equation 1. 
Table 2, Panel B details my summary statistics. The Missouri summary statistics 
are comparable to those of the national sample. The mean (median) of TAXABLE SALES 
is 17.21 (17.01), which represents $1,560 ($1,346) per person per quarter. Again, wage 
income represents the largest income source with an annual average of $7,420 per person. 
The average Missouri county population during my sample period is 48,067, but the 
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median is 18,057, indicating population varies significantly between counties. The 
employment rate, including all persons, is about 51 percent, which is in line with the 
national average. 
Table 3, Panel B displays Pearson and Spearman correlations. Correlations are 
consistent with those from the national sample in Panel A. 
Table 5 shows the results of the second hypothesis. Column 1 includes the full set 
of control variables with county and year fixed effects. The coefficient on EBT of 0.079 
is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01). This indicates that after EBT implementation 
reduced cash, reported taxable sales increased by about eight percent compared to the 
pre-period average of $1,472 per person per quarter. This equated to about a $116.30 
increase per person per quarter. In the aggregate, this increase in taxable sales is $637.32 
million per quarter at the state level. Based on the current state sales tax rate of 4.225 
percent, Missouri’s EBT implementation increased state sales tax revenue by $27 million 
per quarter. 
I again develop my range of magnitude estimates from the SNAP and TANF 
expenditures transferred to the EBT program. In Missouri, average SNAP expenditures 
are $364 million and TANF expenditures are $300 million, annually. I compare these 
dollar amounts to the total increase in reported taxable sales to determine the impact of a 
decrease to cash circulation on tax compliance. I estimate a direct decrease to cash 
circulation ranging from $301 to $666 million per year after EBT implementation. Using 
this range of estimates, I calculate that transitioning a dollar of cash payment to a dollar 
of digital payment, increases reported taxable sales between $3.83 and $8.48. 
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In Column 2, I test whether the effect on reported taxable sales are less 
pronounced in areas less likely to be affected by EBT implementation. Counties with 
higher income levels per capita are less likely to receive government welfare payments 
and might be less affected by the switch from cash payments. To test this, I interact EBT 
with WAGE to examine the effect of the EBT transition in wealthier counties. I find the 
coefficient on EBT* WAGE of -0.003 is negative and significant (p-value < 0.1), 
indicating the effect is less pronounced in high-wage areas that are less likely to receive 
government welfare payments. This evidence is consistent with the decrease in cash 
circulation affecting the observed increase in reported taxable income. 
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Chapter 5: Additional Analysis 
5.1 PRE-TREATMENT TRENDS 
In this section, I provide evidence of pre-treatment trends. For my identification 
strategy, I presume the control samples (county-years that have not adopted EBT) are an 
appropriate counterfactual to the treated groups (county-years that have adopted EBT). 
The presumption does not require the level of taxable income to be equal between 
treatment and control counties prior to EBT implementation, but rather, that taxable 
income would have followed the same trend except for EBT implementation. If the two 
groups have deviating pre-treatment trends, it is difficult to determine how the trends 
might have continued without treatment. “Pre-treatment trends can also influence why 
some jurisdictions adopted rules, while others did not” (Atanasov and Black 2016) – an 
important element in this setting as states elected when to implement EBT. 
To assess the validity of the identification strategy, I plot coefficients to analyze 
the trends in my outcome variables prior to and after EBT implementation. To evaluate 
pre-treatment trends, I replace the treatment indicator for EBT implementation with a 
series of county-specific variables to allow the outcome variables to vary with time. Each 
county’s adoption date is designated as time zero. I then evaluate the outcome variables 
relative to the adoption date and estimate the average treatment effects following the 
regression framework from the main analyses. Coefficients of the regression are plotted 
along with ninety-five-percent confidence intervals. 
Figure 4 depicts the pre-treatment trends for taxable income. The results provided 
are consistent with reported taxable income increasing after EBT adoption. After EBT 
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adoption, treated counties show increased taxable income relative to control counties. 
The increase in reported taxable income begins after adoption and becomes statistically 
significant in the post periods. The overall pattern supports the assumption that 
non-adopting counties are a suitable control group and the change in cash circulation 
affected tax compliance. 
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5.2 FALSIFICATION USING ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF INCOME 
Next, I test whether alternative economic factors other than EBT implementation 
could have increased reported taxable sales and income. As stated earlier, during EBT 
implementation, I am unable to measure directly the income of small businesses. 
Therefore, it is possible other income sources drive the observed increase in reported 
taxable income post EBT implementation. To address this concern, I re-estimate 
Equations 1 and 2 but replace the dependent variable with WAGE, EMPLOYMENT, and 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST. A finding that these other income sources are not 
significantly higher in the post period supports the theory that the observed increase in 
reported income is concentrated among small businesses. 
Table 6, Panel A presents the results for the national sample. Across the three 
specifications, I find no evidence to indicate that other sources of income are significantly 
higher in the post period. As expected, there are no significant results for WAGE or 
EMPLOYMENT. Interestingly, a significant but negative coefficient exists on 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST. This might be the result of the increased tax compliance 
costs reducing taxpayers’ ability to spend or invest money that had previously gone 
unreported to the government. Notably, however, none of these other types of income 
affects the increase in reported taxable income reported in Table 4. These results suggest 
the change in cash circulation from EBT implementation caused the increase in reported 
taxable income. 
Table 6, Panel B presents the Missouri sample results. The findings are generally 
consistent with the national sample and do not indicate significant results for WAGE or 
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EMPLOYMENT. A significant but negative coefficient on DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST 
does exist. As with the previous sample, there is no evidence to indicate that the increase 
in taxable sales reported in Table 5 is driven by these other types of income. Overall, 
these tests support the theory that a decrease to cash circulation increases the tax 
compliance of small businesses. 
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5.3 CAPITAL ALLOCATION, EVIDENCE FROM SMALL BUSINESS LOANS 
In this section, I examine the effect of cash circulation on capital allocation for 
small businesses. Because tax returns provide verifiable income information, banks 
generally rely on them to support loan applications (Morse et al. 2009).24 However, if a 
small business does not report its cash income to the tax agency, it generally cannot use 
that income to support a bank loan. “Accordingly, a small business owner who fails to 
fully report income for tax purposes sacrifices the capacity of the unreported income to 
support bank financing and must make do with savings or other self-financing strategies” 
(Morse et al. 2009). Therefore, I posit the decrease to cash circulation caused by EBT 
implementation will lead to a corresponding increase in bank lending to small businesses. 
If so, increasing tax compliance generates a positive consequence to capital formation. 
To test this conjecture, I use the U.S. Small Business Administration’s 7(a) loan 
program as the setting. As stated by the SBA “the 7(a) loan program is the SBA’s 
primary program for providing financial assistance to small businesses.”25 Only small 
businesses – generally fewer than 500 employees – qualify for SBA 7(a) loans. The 
business must operate for profit in the United States, and the owner must have invested 
equity in the form of time or capital.26 Businesses must submit an SBA 7(a) application 
                                                 
24 The fact that banks rely on tax returns to validate loan amounts is further supported by evidence that 
only about one third of private firms produce financial statements (Lisowsky and Minnis 2020) and that tax 
returns serve as substitutes for financial statements (Minnis and Sutherland 2017). Additionally, the 
National Survey of Small Business Finances conducted by the Federal Reserve Board indicates less than 20 
percent of small businesses even use financial statements (Allee and Yohn 2009). 
25 https://www.sba.gov/partners/lenders/7a-loan-program/types-7a-loans#section-header-2 
26 Certain businesses are specifically excluded from qualifying, including real estate investment firms, 
firms involved in speculative activities, rare coin and stamp dealers, firms whose stock in trade is money, 
pyramid sales plans, firms involved in gambling activities, not-for-profit institutions, and firms involved in 
illegal activities.  
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along with supporting documents such as a personal background statement, projected 
financials, business license, business lease, and income tax returns for the previous three 
years. Applicants must obtain IRS income tax return transcripts prior to SBA loan 
submission. Transcripts are obtained by submitting form 4506-T, which eliminates the 
possibility that taxpayers could submit different returns to the government and to the 
lender. SBA loans have more lenient approval criteria than conventional loans, but still 
hinge on the business’s financial integrity. 
The terms, rates, and amounts of SBA loans vary based on the applicant’s needs 
and qualifications. The current Standard 7(a) loan has a maximum amount of $5 million 
and a maximum maturity of ten to twenty-five years, depending on the business type. The 
interest rate paid is equal to a base rate plus between two and six percent.27 Different 
types of 7(a) loans can impact the terms and turnaround time, but the Standard 7(a) loan 
is the most common. 
I obtain data on SBA 7(a) loans from Freedom of Information Act information 
hosted by the U.S. Small Business Administration. The data include information on 7(a) 
loans spanning the full national EBT implementation period from 1990-2007. Data 
include the total loan amount, the amount of the loan charged off, and the address of the 
borrower. I use the borrower address to aggregate the loan data at the county level using 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention County Cross Reference File. In total, the 
                                                 
27 The base rate “may be pegged to the lowest prime rate, the LIBOR Rate, or the SBA optional peg rate. 
The optional peg rate is a weighted average of rates the federal government pays for loans with maturities 
similar to the average SBA loan.” https://www.sba.gov/partners/lenders/7a-loan-program/terms-conditions-
eligibility#section-header-5 
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sample includes 833,813 individual small business loans with a mean (median) loan and 
charge off amount of $201,215 ($153,000) and $16,038 ($715). 
To test the impact of EBT implementation on small business lending, I 
re-estimate Equation 1 and replace the outcome variable with three measures of loans to 
small businesses. The first measure is LOAN AMOUNT, which is the total SBA 7(a) loan 
amount divided by the number of loans issued per county. Second, LOAN CHARGEOFF 
is the total balance charged off from a loan divided by the number of loans issued per 
county. Third, LOAN COUNT is the number of loans issued by county. 
Table 7 presents the results for small business lending. In Column 1 the 
coefficient on LOAN AMOUNT is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01). The 
coefficient of 12,224.79 indicates that after EBT implementation, SBA loan amounts 
increased by $12,224.79 or by about six percent compared to the pre-period average. This 
result supports the position that SBA loan applicants were able to support higher loan 
amounts by reporting more income on their tax return, and the decrease to cash 
circulation caused the change in reporting.  
Table 7, Column 2 finds the coefficient on LOAN CHARGEOFF is positive but 
not significant at conventional levels. The positive coefficient indicates EBT did not 
improve loan quality. This finding is unsurprising because, even though applicants likely 
report higher income on their tax returns after EBT implementation, they do not 
necessarily have a greater ability to repay a loan in terms of cash flow. In fact, applicants 
would most likely experience a weaker ability to repay a loan because of the increased 
tax outflows from reporting the income. Column 3 does not indicate a significant 
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coefficient on LOAN COUNT. This result is expected as a tax reporting change is 
unlikely to significantly impact the number of small businesses seeking SBA loans. 
Taken together, the results indicate that increased tax compliance led to an increase in the 




5.4 FALSIFICATION USING RANDOMIZED TREATMENT ITERATIONS 
I next perform a falsification test to address concerns that the increases in taxable 
sales and taxable income were not caused by the EBT implementation. An alternate 
explanation is that significant results could be found in various assignments of the pre 
and post indicators on each observation and I am incorrectly attributing the results to the 
EBT programs. To perform this test I randomly assign pre and post period indicators to 
observations in both the within-Missouri and national settings. I then re-estimate the 
baseline regressions with all of the same parameters from the original analysis. I repeat 
this analysis over 1,000 total iterations and measure the percentage of estimates that are 
significant. 
Table 8, Panel A reports the results from the randomized falsification analysis for 
the national sample. Consistent with the falsification test above, the baseline regression 
for this analysis is Table 4, Column 1. In this analysis, 94 percent of the iterations are not 
significant at the same level as the baseline regression, consistent with the EBT 
implementation, causing the higher levels of reported taxable income.  
Table 8, Panel B reports the results from the randomized falsification analysis for 
the within-Missouri sample. The baseline comparison regression for this analysis is Table 
5, Column 1. Consistent with a reduction in cash causing an increase in reported taxable 
sales, I do not find statistically significant results at the standard levels of significance for 
the expected percent of iterations. Specifically, 99 percent of the iterations are not 
significant at the same level as the baseline regression. Overall, the results support the 
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5.5 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION UNDERBANKED SURVEY 
Finally, I use the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked 
Households as a third measure of cash circulation. The FDIC first conducted the 
household survey in 2009 and continues to do so on a biennial basis. The most recent 
data available are for 2017. Because the survey occurred in a later period than EBT 
implementation, it is possible to directly capture small business income from sole 
proprietorships and test the association (see Figure 3). The data are available at the state 
level and for 273 MSAs, which provides needed variation in the analyses. The survey 
includes a series of questions to determine an individual’s banking status. It also includes 
information about why individuals are underbanked as well as general demographics 
such as age and education levels. 
The survey indicates that “18.7 percent of U.S. households were “underbanked” 
in 2017, meaning the household had an account at an insured institution but also obtained 
financial products or services outside the banking system. Specifically, a household is 
categorized as underbanked if it had a checking or savings account and used one of the 
following products or services from an alternative financial services (AFS) provider in 
the past 12 months: money orders, check cashing, international remittances, payday 
loans, refund anticipation loans, rent-to-own services, pawn shop loans, or auto title 
loans.” (Underbanked Executive Summary 2017). 
Underbanked households are more likely to rely on cash as a means of exchange 
relative to other transaction methods. According to the FDIC survey, 26.2 percent of 
underbanked households pay bills with cash, and 41.3 percent receive income in the form 
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of a paper check or cash. I use the underbanked rate to proxy for the relative cash 
circulation within an MSA. I use underbanked households instead of unbanked because I 
am better able to capture the effect of cash spending on reported income for two reasons. 
First, the percentage of underbanked households is significantly larger than unbanked 
households (18.7 percent compared to 6.5 percent). Second, compared to unbanked 
households, underbanked households have significantly higher levels of income with 
approximately 55.8 percent above $30,000. I predict the percentage of underbanked 
households is associated with lower reported income from sole proprietorships. 
I collect data on the number of underbanked households from the FDIC National 
Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households. Table 1, Panel C reports the sample 
construction for the underbanked sample. I collect income measures from the SOI at the 
county level and match to the FDIC survey at the MSA level using the National Bureau 
of Economic Research CBSA (Core-Based Statistical Area) to FIPS (Federal Information 
Processing Standards) County Crosswalk linking table for a total sample of 1,060 MSA-
year observations.28 Starting in 2010, the SOI began reporting components of gross 
income, which permit more powerful tests of the theory. Thus, the underbanked sample 
begins with the 2011 biennial survey and ends in 2017, the most recent year for which 
both the FDIC survey and SOI data are available. I remove observations missing 
sufficient data from the FDIC for a final sample of 1,032 MSA-years.29 
                                                 
28 The linking table is available at https://www.nber.org/data/cbsa-fips-county-crosswalk.html 
29 In 2017, the total number of returns that reported business or professional net income or loss was 
25,952,780 with a total net income of $348 billion reported. My sample has an average of 77,718 returns 
reporting income per MSA-year. With 258 MSAs included in my sample per year, I cover an average of 
20,051,244 returns per year. This indicates my sample covers about 77 percent of the returns filed. 
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I test my expectation by examining the association between under-banking and 
reported small business income using the following OLS pooled, cross-sectional 
regression: 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐸𝐷 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑚𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑚𝑦 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑚𝑦 +
𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑦 + 𝑚𝑦 (3) 
The outcome variable is one of four measures of income reported on an individual tax 
return. The IRS began separately reporting income types in 2010, so I can capture 
different income measures.30 BUSINESS INCOME is the business income reported on 
Schedule C (in thousands) on an individual tax return (Form 1040) divided by the number 
of returns filed that reported business income by MSA. BUSINESS INCOME is less 
verifiable than other forms of income and, therefore, more likely to be associated with 
cash circulation. The other three measures of income are all more verifiable and, 
therefore, less likely to be affected by cash. SALARY AND WAGE is the salary and wage 
income amount reported (in thousands) divided by the number of returns reporting wage 
income. INTEREST is the amount of interest income reported (in thousands) divided by 
the number of returns reporting interest income. DIVIDENDS are ordinary dividends 
reported (in thousands) divided by the number of returns reporting dividends. 
My variable of interest is UNDERBANKED, which captures a population that is 
more likely to rely on cash as a means of transaction. UNDERBANKED is measured as 
the percentage of FDIC survey respondents identified as underbanked by MSA per year. 
                                                 
30 The FDIC first administered the underbanked survey in 2009. However, due to the IRS reporting change 
in 2010, I begin my sample period in 2011 and conclude with the most recent survey data in 2017. 
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A significant coefficient on UNDERBANKED indicates the taxable income reported by 
small businesses is associated with the cash. 
I control for other factors available in the FDIC survey data that can affect 
reported incomes. I control for the average age of survey respondents (AGE) because 
earnings potential fluctuates with age. AGE is the average age group of survey 
respondents within an MSA measured in ten-year increments from 15 to 64 and then as 
65 years or greater. EMPLOYMENT RATE captures the percentage of survey respondents 
identified as employed because employment status directly affects income. EDUCATION 
controls for education level, which is categorized in four groups: no high school diploma, 
high school diploma, some college, and college degree. Finally, Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of a state is included and measured in billions of dollars, to control for overall 
economic activity within a state. 
Table 2, Panel C details summary statistics. The average percentage of 
underbanked households in an MSA is about 10 percent. Salary and wage income 
represent the largest source of income with the average of $49,502 per reporting tax 
return. Business income is, on average, $12,355 per reporting tax return. The average age 
group is from 45 to 54 years old, and the average respondent received a high school 
diploma. The employment rate is similar to the two EBT settings at 57 percent. 
Table 3, Panel C displays the correlation table. BUSINESS INCOME is generally 
positively correlated with the different types of income as well as AGE GROUP, 
EMPLOYMENT RATE, EDUCATION, and STATE GDP. Additionally, it is negatively 
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correlated with UNDERBANKED, which provides preliminary evidence in support my 
expectation. 
Table 9 reports the results. In Column 1, I test the association with reported 
BUSINESS INCOME and find the coefficient on UNDERBANKED of -2.827 is negative 
and significant (p-value < 0.05). This indicates that areas more likely to rely on cash have 
lower reported levels of income from small businesses. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in UNDERBANKED is associated with a decrease of $149.83 reported 
income per business. 
In Columns 2 through 4 the dependent variables are SALARY AND WAGE, 
INTEREST, and DIVIDENDS. Consistent with expectations, I do not find significant 
results for any of the more verifiable types of income. These results suggest the higher 
business income is not being driven by other economic factors. Overall, the evidence is 
consistent with higher levels of cash circulation being associated with lower levels of 
reported business income. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Cash plays a significant role in tax compliance. Because of the difficulty in 
verifying cash-based transactions, public policy experts speculate that cash is used to 
underreport income to tax authorities. However, due to the concealment activities of tax 
evaders, studying and quantifying the impact of cash on tax evasion remains a difficult 
problem. Using several measures of cash circulation, I provide new evidence on the 
impact of cash on tax compliance. 
I capture a reduction to cash circulation plausibly exogenous to true income and 
spending habits using the implementation of the EBT program. I find that when 
government replaces cash payments with digital payments, reported taxable income and 
reported taxable sales both increase. Specifically, I find that, per replaced dollar, reported 
taxable income increases between $0.56 and $1.15 and reported taxable sales increase 
between $3.83 and $8.48. Importantly, the results are not driven by an increase to other 
types of income. 
Additionally, using the data on small business loans from the SBA, I examine the 
impact of reduced cash circulation on capital allocation. I find that small business loan 
amounts increased after EBT implementation by about six percent. The result is 
consistent with small businesses reporting increased income on their tax returns after 
EBT implementation and, thus, improving tax compliance and capital allocation. 
The results remain robust to a number of additional tests and falsification checks. 
Parallel trends do not reveal differences in pre-treatment trends, and the results do not 
appear to be driven by increases to other types of income, such as wages, dividends, or 
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interest. Additionally, as expected, I do not find significant results using randomized 
placebo implementation periods. 
Finally, I use the FDIC National Survey of Underbanked Households data to 
confirm the effect is concentrated among small businesses, which are most likely to 
experience a change to cash circulation. This analysis is possible because IRS income 
data are more granular in the recent FDIC survey period. Evidence is consistent with my 
main analyses. Small businesses use cash as a method to evade an economically 
significant amount of tax.  
Overall, my results support public policy experts’ claim that a decrease to cash 
circulation can increase tax compliance. Policies to reduce cash include removing high 
denomination bills from circulation (Sands 2016), phasing out cash altogether (Rogoff 
2017), or taxing cash withdrawals (Benshalom 2012). These plans would effectively 
reduce cash circulation, however, each has practical limitations and may negatively 
impact low-income communities that disproportionately rely on cash. 
My paper provides direct evidence on the degree to which cash impacts tax evasion 
and demonstrates cash-based tax evasion can be reduced without regulating cash directly. 
Instead, governments can incentivize non-cash transactions, which are both more verifiable 
and secure than cash. Practicably, policy makers can improve access to mobile banking 
(Apaam et al. 2018), subsidize electronic point of sale systems for small businesses, 
provide accessible, low-cost bank accounts, or continue to transition state, cash-based 
welfare programs to EBT systems. Such proposals are likely to improve tax compliance 
while limiting the negative complications of limiting access to cash. My findings can help 
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policy makers as they evaluate systems that can equitably reduce cash circulation and help 
improve tax compliance. 
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Table 1: Sample construction 
Panel A: EBT Implementation, United States – for tests of Hypothesis 1a 
Total county-years available from IRS 56,400  
Less: missing tax return data (40) 
Less: missing economic data from BEA (1,022) 
County-years used for estimation 55,338  
Panel A: Sample consists of 55,338 county-year observations from 1990-2007 with sufficient data from SOI 
and BEA for estimation. My sample contains an average of 3,074 counties per year. There are 3,142 counties 
in the United States according to the United States Geological Survey. 
 
Panel B: EBT Implementation, Missouri – for tests of Hypothesis 1b 
Total county-quarters available from the Missouri Department of Revenue 2,760  
Less: missing income data from BEA (24) 
County-years used for estimation 2,736  
Panel B: Sample consists of 2,736 county-quarter observations within the state of Missouri from 1995-2000 
with sufficient data from the Missouri Department of Revenue and BEA for estimation. My sample contains 
an average of 114 counties per quarter. There are a total of 115 counties in the state of Missouri. 
 
Panel C: Underbanked Sample – Additional analysis 
Total MSA-years included in the FDIC survey 1,060  
Less: missing underbanked data (28) 
MSA-years used for estimation 1,032  
Panel C: Sample consists of 1,032 MSA-year observations from 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, years in which 
the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households was conducted. The United States 
Office of Management and Budget lists a total of 384 MSAs in the United States and the FDIC survey data 
materials list a total of 301 MSAs. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Panel A: EBT Implementation, National 
  Mean St. dev. P25 Median P75 
GROSS INCOME 12.731 1.586 11.654 12.566 13.632 
WAGE 9.162 6.116 5.885 8.039 10.858 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST  4.183 2.023 3.013 3.873 4.895 
RETIREMENT 3.469 0.908 2.843 3.399 4.026 
SUPPLEMENTAL 2.287 1.453 1.510 2.046 2.751 
TRANSFER RECEIPTS 3.945 1.009 3.261 3.880 4.572 
EMPLOYMENT 0.505 0.149 0.410 0.494 0.581 
POPULATION 88.500 288.719 10.863 24.289 61.275 
N  55,338  
    
Panel A: Sample consists of 55,338 county-year observations from 1990-2007 with sufficient data from SOI and BEA for estimation. Variable definitions 
and sources are included in Appendix D. 
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Table 2 continued 
Panel B: EBT Implementation, Missouri 
  Mean St. dev. P25 Median P75 
TAXABLE SALES 17.212 1.368 16.195 17.014 17.877 
WAGE 7.420 4.177 4.605 6.320 8.940 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST  3.843 1.022 3.109 3.860 4.355 
RETIREMENT 3.605 0.719 3.100 3.601 4.115 
SUPPLEMENTAL 1.821 0.890 1.212 1.585 2.200 
TRANSFER RECEIPTS 4.012 0.819 3.456 4.008 4.583 
EMPLOYMENT 0.507 0.112 0.429 0.494 0.577 
POPULATION 48.067 119.625 10.316 18.057 34.394 
N  2,736  
    
Panel B: Sample consists of 2,736 county-year observations within the state of Missouri from 1995-2000 with sufficient data from the Missouri Department 
of Revenue and BEA for estimation. Variable definitions and sources are included in Appendix D. 
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Table 2 continued 
Panel C: Underbanked Sample (Additional analysis) 
  Mean St. dev. P25 Median P75 
BUSINESS INCOME 12.355 3.573 10.036 11.831 14.026 
UNDERBANKED 0.105 0.053 0.067 0.098 0.133 
SALARY AND WAGE 49.502 10.360 43.385 47.746 53.317 
INTEREST 1.854 1.014 1.318 1.612 2.080 
DIVIDENDS 7.040 4.804 4.834 6.122 7.826 
AGE GROUP 4.050 0.314 3.858 4.043 4.227 
EMPLOYMENT RATE 0.569 0.090 0.518 0.577 0.626 
EDUCATION 2.724 0.234 2.593 2.742 2.868 
STATE GDP 664.511 664.389 221.897 432.718 772.477 
N  1,032  
    
Panel C: Sample consists of 1,032 MSA-year observations from 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, years in which the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and 
Underbanked Households was conducted. Variable definitions and sources are included in Appendix D. 
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Table 3: Correlation tables 
Panel A: EBT Implementation, National 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 GROSS INCOME  0.44 0.20 -0.17 0.38 -0.16 0.15 0.53 
2 WAGE 0.60  0.34 -0.11 0.93 -0.11 0.80 0.29 
3 DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST  0.18 0.38  -0.05 0.27 -0.12 0.48 0.16 
4 RETIREMENT -0.19 -0.11 -0.06  -0.06 0.98 -0.05 -0.07 
5 SUPPLEMENTAL 0.56 0.96 0.35 -0.03  -0.06 0.76 0.23 
6 TRANSFER RECEIPTS -0.19 -0.13 -0.16 0.98 -0.05  -0.11 -0.05 
7 EMPLOYMENT 0.16 0.72 0.62 -0.02 0.69 -0.09  0.13 
8 POPULATION 0.98 0.55 0.08 -0.19 0.51 -0.16 0.09  
Panel A: This table presents correlations for all variables used in the main regression analysis. Sample consists of 55,338 county-year observations from 
1990-2007 with sufficient data from SOI and BEA for estimation. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. 
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Table 3 continued 
Panel B: EBT Implementation, Missouri 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 TAXABLE SALES  0.77 0.35 -0.31 0.72 -0.29 0.47 0.68 
2 WAGE 0.69  0.55 -0.08 0.98 -0.07 0.81 0.64 
3 DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST  0.18 0.43  0.06 0.52 -0.03 0.61 0.48 
4 RETIREMENT -0.30 -0.04 0.10  -0.08 0.99 -0.02 -0.19 
5 SUPPLEMENTAL 0.65 0.98 0.41 -0.04  -0.07 0.82 0.56 
6 TRANSFER RECEIPTS -0.29 -0.06 0.01 0.99 -0.05  -0.05 -0.18 
7 EMPLOYMENT 0.35 0.78 0.60 0.03 0.78 -0.01  0.37 
8 POPULATION 0.96 0.59 0.09 -0.39 0.55 -0.37 0.23  
Panel B: This table presents correlations for all variables used in the main regression analysis. Sample consists of 2,736 county-year observations within 
the state of Missouri from 1995-2000 with sufficient data from the Missouri Department of Revenue and BEA for estimation. Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. 
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Table 3 continued 
Panel C: Underbanked Sample (Additional analysis) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 BUSINESS INCOME  -0.23 0.65 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.29 
2 UNDERBANKED -0.22  -0.23 -0.02 -0.06 -0.27 0.09 -0.24 0.00 
3 SALARY AND WAGE 0.54 -0.24  0.33 0.34 -0.05 0.29 0.47 0.10 
4 INTEREST 0.08 0.05 0.13  0.60 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.08 
5 DIVIDENDS 0.27 -0.12 0.44 0.62  -0.04 0.13 0.13 0.11 
6 AGE GROUP 0.10 -0.25 -0.07 -0.15 -0.04  -0.49 -0.12 -0.07 
7 EMPLOYMENT RATE 0.12 0.08 0.38 0.12 0.15 -0.47  0.32 -0.05 
8 EDUCATION 0.28 -0.20 0.53 0.12 0.24 -0.10 0.31  -0.11 
9 STATE GDP 0.20 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.02 -0.11 -0.12  
Panel C: This table presents correlations for all variables used in the main regression analysis. Sample consists of 1,032 MSA-year observations from 
2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, years in which the FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households was conducted. Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. 
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Table 4 Reported gross income after staggered national electronic benefit transfer 
implementation 
 
(1) (2)  
GROSS INCOME GROSS INCOME 




-0.005***   
(-5.362) 
WAGE 0.003 0.013***  
(0.988) (3.536) 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST 0.027*** 0.028***  
(2.911) (2.998) 
RETIREMENT 0.232*** 0.214***  
(7.820) (7.142) 
SUPPLEMENTAL -0.005 -0.012**  
(-0.821) (-2.131) 
TRANSFER RECEIPTS -0.312*** -0.297***  
(-11.314) (-10.582) 
EMPLOYMENT 0.205*** 0.072  
(3.217) (1.164) 
POPULATION 0.001*** 0.001***  
(4.680) (4.749) 
Observations 55,338 55,338 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995 0.996 
County fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of OLS estimates of Equation 1, which tests the impact of the national staggered 
EBT program implementation on reported taxable income. My sample consists of 55,338 county-year 
observations from 1990 to 2007 with sufficient data for estimation. See Appendix D for all variable 
definitions and sources. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
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Table 5 Reported taxable sales after staggered electronic benefit transfer implementation 
in Missouri 
  (1) (2) 
  TAXABLE SALES TAXABLE SALES 
EBT 0.079*** 0.098*** 
  (9.988) (7.581) 
EBT*WAGE  -0.003* 
  (-1.819) 
WAGE 0.007 0.017 
 (0.488) (1.168) 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST 0.006 0.006 
 (0.270) (0.306) 
RETIREMENT 0.016 -0.020 
 (0.121) (-0.153) 
SUPPLEMENTAL -0.025 -0.023 
 (-0.402) (-0.379) 
TRANSFER RECEIPTS -0.053 -0.018 
 (-0.404) (-0.142) 
EMPLOYMENT 0.183 0.123 
 (1.285) (0.845) 
POPULATION 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (4.073) (4.129) 
Observations 2,736 2,736 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994 0.994 
County fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of OLS estimates of Equation 2, which tests the impact of the staggered EBT 
program implementation within the state of Missouri on reported taxable sales. My sample consists of 2,736 
county-quarter observations from January 1995 to December 2000 with sufficient data for estimation. See 
Appendix D for all variable definitions and sources. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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Table 6 Falsification test for more verifiable types of income 
Panel A: EBT Implementation, National 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
WAGE EMPLOYMENT DIVIDENDS 
AND INTEREST 
EBT 0.001 -0.000 -0.038*** 
  (0.071) (-0.193) (-3.054) 
    
Observations 55,338 55,338 55,338 
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.977 0.442 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of OLS estimates of Equation 1 with the dependent variable replaced with 
WAGE, EMPLOYMENT, and DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST. My sample consists of 55,338 county-year 
observations from 1990 to 2007 with sufficient data for estimation. See Appendix D for all variable 
definitions and sources. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Panel B: EBT Implementation, Missouri 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
WAGE EMPLOYMENT DIVIDENDS 
AND INTEREST 
EBT 0.024 -0.001 -0.023** 
  (1.046) (-1.134) (-2.538) 
    
Observations 2,736 2,736 2,736 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996 0.978 0.985 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of OLS estimates of Equation 2 with the dependent variable replaced with 
WAGE, EMPLOYMENT, and DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST. My sample consists of 2,736 county-quarter 
observations from January 1995 to December 2000 with sufficient data for estimation. See Appendix D for 
all variable definitions and sources. Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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Table 7: Reported small business loans after staggered national electronic benefit transfer 
implementation 







EBT 12,224.79*** 1,582.10 0.180 
  (3.33) (1.37) (0.240) 
WAGE 3,910.68*** -101.58 1.528 
 (3.11) (-0.26) (0.700) 
RETIREMENT -4,130.83* -129.77 3.161 
 (-1.95) (-0.50) (1.584) 
DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST 48,866.37** 3,105.24 16.136 
 (2.43) (0.58) (1.144) 
SUPPLEMENTAL 2,720.13 -36.72 12.776*** 
 (0.46) (-0.02) (2.710) 
TRANSFER RECEIPTS -51,474.63*** -7,850.43 -14.951 
 (-2.71) (-1.58) (-1.575) 
EMPLOYMENT -89,658.72 19,577.56 -104.185* 
 (-1.61) (1.50) (-1.939) 
POPULATION -97.50*** 14.30** 0.938*** 
 (-2.70) (2.21) (3.333) 
Observations 40,102 40,102 40,102 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.048 0.788 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of OLS estimates of small business loans after EBT implementation. My 
sample consists of 40,102 county-year observations from 833,813 loans from 1990 to 2007 with sufficient 
data for estimation. See Appendix D for all variable definitions and sources. Robust standard errors are 





Table 8: Falsification tests using randomized iterations of pre/post treatment assignment 
Panel A: Randomized iterations of EBT Implementation – National 
Iterated equation Iterations 
Percent of iterations not significant at 
10% 5% 1% level of baseline comparison: 6.3% 
Table 4, Column 1 
Equation 1: 
[Hypothesis 1a] Reported taxable 
income increases after EBT 
implementation 
1,000 90.90% 95.50% 99.40% 94.20% 
Panel A: This is a falsification test for the results presented in Table 4, Column 1 on the EBT Implementation nationally. I randomly assign pre and post 
periods to state-year observations and re-estimate Equation 1. I repeat this process for 1,000 iterations and measure the percentage of estimations that were 
significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, and baseline comparison level. My sample consists of 55,338 county-year observations from 1990-2007 with sufficient data 
for estimation 
 
Panel B: Randomized iterations of EBT Implementation – Missouri 
Iterated equation Iterations 
Percent of iterations not significant at 
10% 5% 1% level of baseline comparison: < 0.01% 
Table 5, Column 1  
Equation 2: 
[Hypothesis 1b] Reported taxable 
sales increase after EBT 
implementation 
1,000 90.10% 94.80% 98.30% 99.70% 
Panel A: This is a falsification test for the results presented in Table 5, Column 1 on the EBT Implementation within the state of Missouri. I randomly 
assign pre and post periods to county-quarter observations and re-estimate Equation 2. I repeat this process for 1,000 iterations and measure the percentage 
of estimations that were significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, and baseline comparison level. My sample consists of 2,736 county-quarter observations from January 
1995 to December 2000 with sufficient data for estimation. 
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Table 9: The association between the underbanked and income types 






UNDERBANKED -2.827** -1.055 -0.254 1.031 
  (-2.195) (-0.275) (-0.544) (0.574) 






INTEREST 0.549*** 2.130***  2.498*** 
 (3.341) (4.595)  (11.853) 
DIVIDENDS 0.055** 0.073* 0.084***  
 (2.203) (1.879) (3.315)  
AGE 0.772*** -1.598** 0.033 -0.050 
 (3.501) (-2.385) (0.570) (-0.206) 
EMPLOYMENT RATE 0.527 7.923*** 0.373 2.476** 
 (0.717) (3.163) (1.363) (2.200) 
EDUCATION 1.561*** 8.627*** -0.525*** -0.019 
 (4.864) (9.428) (-5.169) (-0.049) 
STATE GDP -0.002** 0.009** -0.000** 0.001 
 (-2.289) (2.376) (-2.087) (1.253) 
BUSINESS INCOME 
 
1.633*** 0.071*** 0.211*** 
 
 
(9.904) (3.393) (4.668) 
Observations 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 
Adjusted R-squared 0.777 0.688 0.644 0.528 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of OLS estimates of Equation 3, which tests the association between 
underbanked households and reported taxable incomes. My sample consists of 1,032 MSA-year observations 
from the years 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, years in which the underbanked survey data are available. See 
Appendix D for all variable definitions and sources. Robust standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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Figure 1: National EBT implementation by number of states that implemented per year 
 
My sample period covers the years 1990-2007. The graph depicts the number of states, including Washington 
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EBT (Electronic Benefit Transfer) Implementation Dates 
1. June 1997 
2. September 1997 
3. October 1997 
4. November 1997 
5. January 1998 
6. February 1998 
7. March 1998 
8. May 1998 
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Figure 3: Timeline of data availability and sample periods 
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Figure 4: Pre-treatment trends 
 
      
This figure reports the point estimates from a county-panel regression of GROSS INCOME on an indicator 
for EBT adoption, control variables, county, and year fixed effects. The specification allows the effect of 




APPENDIX A: PROGRAMS AVAILABLE ON A STATE’S EBT SYSTEM 
A detailed table of programs that are available through a state’s EBT system 
State SNAP TANF Other Programs available 
Alabama Yes Yes  
Alaska Yes Yes  
Arizona Yes Yes TRE (Training Related Expenses) 
Arkansas Yes Yes  
California Yes Yes California Food Assistance Program (CFAP), 
Work Incentive Nutritional Supplement (WINS), 
General Assistance, Refugee Assistance, and State 
Utility Assistance Subsidy (SUAS) 
Colorado Yes Yes Child Care, Old Age Pension (OAP), Aid to the 
Needy Disabled (AND), Aid to the Blind (AB), 
Health Care Allowance (HCA), SSI-Colorado 
Supplement (SSI-CS), Low-Income Energy 
Assistance Program (LIEAP), Child Welfare and 
Subsidized Adoption 
Connecticut Yes Yes State Supplemental (Aid to Aged, 
Blind, Disabled), State Administered General 
Assistance (SAGA), Child Support Passthrough, 
Refugee, and LIHEAP 
Delaware Yes No  
District of 
Columbia 
Yes Yes Refuge Assistance, General 
Assistance for Children, and Disability 
Florida Yes Yes Refugee Cash and E&T support 
Georgia Yes No  
Hawaii Yes Yes TAONF (Temporary Assistance for Other Needy 
Families), General Assistance, AABD, Child Care 
subsidy, and First To Work support services 
Idaho Yes Yes  
Illinois Yes Yes State-Funded Food Assistance, Aid to the Aged 
Blind and Disabled (AABD), Refugee and 
Repatriation Assistance (RRA), TANF Supportive 
Services, WorkFirst, SNAP Employment and 
Training, Child Support Pass-Through, & Crisis 
Assistance 
Indiana Yes Yes  
Iowa Yes No  
Kansas Yes Yes Child Care 
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Kentucky Yes Yes  
Louisiana Yes Yes  
Maine Yes Yes State Supplemental benefits 
Maryland Yes Yes  
Massachusetts Yes Yes Emergency Aid to the Elderly, Disabled and 
Children (EAEDC), Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance (SNA) 
Michigan Yes Yes (Family Independence Program), SDA (State 
Disability Assistance) and LIHEAP (Low Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program). 
Minnesota Yes Yes Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), 
Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA), General 
Assistance (GA), Minnesota Supplemental Aid 
(MSA), Diversionary Work Program (DWP) and 
Emergency Assistance (EA) 
Mississippi Yes No  
Missouri Yes Yes  
Montana Yes Yes TANF supportive services and Refugee cash 
Nebraska Yes No Child Care Time and Attendance 
Nevada Yes Yes  
New 
Hampshire 
Yes Yes Old Age, Aid to Needy, Blind and 
Disabled, State Funded Food Benefit, and 
Refugee Cash 
New Jersey Yes Yes General Assistance (GA) and e-Child Care 
New Mexico Yes Yes General Assistance (GA), Refugee Resettlement , 
Residential Shelter Care, and Support Services 
New York Yes Yes Medicaid, HBE, and HEAP 
North Carolina Yes Yes  
North Dakota Yes No  
Ohio Yes No  
Oklahoma Yes No  
Oregon Yes Yes Refugee Program, Prison Release Funds, Summer 
Electronic Benefit for Children, Low Income Heat 
and Eat Assistance Program and JOBS 
Participation Incentive 
Pennsylvania Yes Yes Cash, General Assistance, SSI, Medicaid 
Rhode Island Yes Yes  
South Carolina Yes No  
South Dakota Yes No  
Tennessee Yes Yes  
Texas Yes Yes TANF-State Program (TANF-SP) 
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Utah Yes Yes General Assistance, Emergency Assistance, 
Refugee Assistance, Medical Transportation, Y 
and Z Funds, and SSI State Supplemental 
Vermont Yes Yes LIHEAP, Fuel benefits (“heat and eat”), cash 
benefits for renters and those that heat with wood. 
Virginia Yes No  
Washington Yes Yes State Financial Assistance, Aged Blind and 
Disabled (ABD), Refugee, Consolidated 
Emergency Assistance, LIHeap, SSP (State 
Portion) 
West Virginia Yes Yes Child Support 
Wisconsin Yes No  
Wyoming Yes No  
The programs available through each state’s EBT program is available from the United States Department of 
Agriculture EBT Status Report 
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APPENDIX B: STATEWIDE EBT IMPLEMENTATION 
A detailed table of the year in which a state’s EBT program became operational statewide 
State 
Year of statewide 
implementation 
State 
Year of statewide 
implementation 
Alabama 1997 Montana 2002 
Alaska 1998 Nebraska 2002 
Arizona 1999 Nevada 2002 
Arkansas 1998 New Hampshire 1999 
California 2004 New Jersey 1999 
Colorado 1998 New Mexico 1995 
Connecticut 1997 New York 2001 
Delaware 2003 North Carolina 1999 
District of Columbia 1998 North Dakota 1997 
Florida 1998 Ohio 1999 
Georgia 1998 Oklahoma 1998 
Hawaii 1998 Oregon 1998 
Idaho 1998 Pennsylvania 1997 
Illinois 1997 Rhode Island 1998 
Indiana 2002 South Carolina 1995 
Iowa 2003 South Dakota 1997 
Kansas 1997 Tennessee 1999 
Kentucky 1999 Texas 1995 
Louisiana 1997 Utah 1996 
Maine 2003 Vermont 1998 
Maryland 1993 Virginia 2002 
Massachusetts 1997 Washington 1999 
Michigan 2001 West Virginia 2003 
Minnesota 1998 Wisconsin 2000 
Mississippi 2002 Wyoming 2000 
Missouri 1998   
The dates of statewide implementation of EBT transfers are available from the United States Department of 
Agriculture EBT Status Report 
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APPENDIX C: STATE SNAP AND TANF EXPENDITURES 
Average SNAP and TANF expenditures per state across 1997-1999. 
State SNAP Expenditures TANF Expenditures 
Alabama $        365,530,150  $         97,497,496  
Alaska  50,286,352   72,257,778  
Arizona  267,384,754   255,839,322  
Arkansas  209,786,978   38,249,765  
California  2,062,384,314   5,704,593,095  
Colorado  161,221,059   134,025,557  
Connecticut  160,243,986   435,051,107  
Delaware*  35,765,654   50,376,626  
District of Columbia  86,429,373   120,063,334  
Florida  906,522,732   704,966,512  
Georgia*  553,989,695   405,670,497  
Hawaii  182,317,910   127,889,928  
Idaho  48,446,736   20,501,664  
Illinois  848,176,282   702,247,242  
Indiana  270,524,709   233,952,033  
Iowa*  112,562,212   158,587,819  
Kansas  91,573,111   155,550,055  
Kentucky  351,115,025   206,930,213  
Louisiana  480,643,527   140,488,131  
Maine  97,542,078   113,839,851  
Maryland  279,510,665   302,133,952  
Massachusetts  229,422,227   686,507,305  
Michigan  593,647,140   1,035,648,303  
Minnesota  181,678,437   280,601,144  
Mississippi*  266,445,271   63,987,779  
Missouri  364,769,826   300,738,815  
Montana  53,395,322   40,641,572  
Nebraska*  68,620,874   83,064,423  
Nevada  64,401,018   61,127,712  
New Hampshire  32,059,672   67,157,941  
New Jersey  392,683,893   490,805,220  
New Mexico  152,212,960   125,420,819  
New York  1,582,693,316   3,371,482,910  
North Carolina  444,662,100   371,941,552  
North Dakota*  26,644,051   24,800,408  
Ohio*  631,282,547   826,229,208  
Oklahoma*  235,953,437   146,988,870  
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Oregon  201,310,661   289,430,236  
Pennsylvania  777,735,505   687,996,404  
Rhode Island  62,577,657   131,606,703  
South Carolina*  265,253,796   69,974,489  
South Dakota*  37,481,516   22,243,083  
Tennessee  445,509,172   200,867,990  
Texas  1,481,638,731   588,569,868  
Utah  75,582,450   94,363,736  
Vermont  36,047,158   63,284,292  
Virginia*  322,840,887   156,191,796  
Washington  317,984,449   524,932,234  
West Virginia  223,807,858   75,500,713  
Wisconsin*  137,445,172   318,187,261  
Wyoming*  21,263,970   6,056,131  
Total $     17,349,008,376 $     21,387,060,896 
Total available through EBT $     17,349,008,376 $     19,054,702,505 
TANF expenditures include both the federal and state maintenance-of-effort (MOE) funds. TANF 
expenditures are available from the U.S. Office of Family Assistance. SNAP expenditures are available from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Amounts presented are averaged from the years 1997 through 1999. * 
indicates TANF payments are not available through the state’s EBT program. 
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APPENDIX D: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition Source† 
   
AGE Average age group of survey respondents by 
MSA. Age groups are identified in ten year 
increments from 15 to 64 years and then as 65 




Business or professional income amount (in 
thousands) divided by the number of returns with 
business or professional income reported by MSA. 
IRS 
DIVIDENDS Ordinary dividends amount (in thousands) divided 





Dividends, interest, and rental income amount (in 
thousands) divided by the number of persons by 
county. 
BEA 
EBT Indicator variable equal to one for time periods 
after the implementation of an EBT program and 
zero otherwise. 
 
EMPLOYMENT Total employment, number of jobs, divided by the 




Percentage of survey respondents identified as 
employed by MSA. 
FDIC 
GROSS INCOME Natural log of reported adjusted gross income (in 
thousands) 
IRS 
INTEREST Taxable interest amount (in thousands) divided by 
the number of returns with taxable income 
reported by MSA. 
IRS 
LOAN AMOUNT Amount of SBA 7(a) loans divided by the number 




Amount of SBA 7(a) loan balances charged off 
divided by the number of loans issued by county 
SBA 
LOAN COUNT Number of SBA 7(a) loans issued by county SBA 
POPULATION Population in number of persons by county (in 
thousands) 
BEA 
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RETIREMENT Retirement income amount (in thousands) divided 




Salaries and wages amount (in thousands) divided 
by the number of returns with salaries and wages 
reported by MSA. 
IRS 
STATE GDP Gross domestic product (in billions) by state BEA 
SUPPLEMENTAL Supplements to wages and salaries, employer 
contributions for employee pensions and insurance 
funds, (in thousands) divided by the number of 
persons by county. 
BEA 





Transfer receipts, benefits received for which no 
services are performed, (in thousands) divided by 
the number of persons by county. 
BEA 
UNDERBANKED Percentage of survey respondents identified as 
underbanked by MSA. 
FDIC 
WAGE Wages and salaries amount (in thousands) divided 
by the number of persons by county. 
BEA 
†FDIC: https://www.economicinclusion.gov/ 
  IRS: https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-county-data 
  BEA: https://www.bea.gov/data/income-saving/personal-income-county-metro-and-other-areas 
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